Abstract-This work seeks to design decisionmaking rules for autonomous agents to jointly influence and optimize the behavior of teamed human decisionmakers in the presence of an adversary. We study a situation in which computational jobs are scheduled on servers by a collection of autonomous machines in concert with self-interested human decisionmakers, and the human and machine schedulers must react to an adversary's attack on one of the servers. We show a simple machine scheduling policy such that if all schedulers have permission to schedule jobs on all servers, increasing the penetration of machine schedulers always increases the level of security in the system, even when the machine schedulers have no explicit coordination or communication amongst themselves. However, we show a companion result in which simple constraints on server availability can nullify the machine schedulers' ability to effectively influence human schedulers; here, even if machine schedulers control an overwhelming majority of jobs, are socially-aware, and fully coordinated amongst themselves, they are incapable of influencing human decisionmakers to mitigate the harm of an attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent rush of technology into society's daily life has promised to solve grand problems, but also may bring with it grand new risks. New technological paradigms such as the Internet of Things allows people to interact with their devices in unprecedented ways, but increased means of interaction may increase vulnerability to adversarial manipulation [1] , [2] . Increasingly, society and technology are participants in each other's affairs, which requires that engineers and computer scientists must be increasingly aware of the effects of each on the other. Autonomous decisionmakers must be designed to interact "well" with human decisionmakers, and this may look fundamentally different from how autonomous decisionmakers typically interact with one another [3] .
In response to these new challenges, game theory (the formal study of interactive decisionmaking) has emerged as a set of mathematical tools which promise to shed some light on the central design tradeoffs in this space [4] - [6] . In applying game theory to these types of systems, it is common to speak of "emergent behavior" in distributed decisionmaking; that is, game theory studies the aggregate behavior which emerges from the entangled decisionmaking processes of autonomous machine agents, human users, and strategic attackers [7] - [9] . This paper represents an initial study on a concept that we term emergent security. That is, we seek concepts which will enable the principled design of autonomous decisionmakers in sociotechnical systems; these autonomous agents should P. N. Brown is an Assistant Professor with the Department of Computer Science at the University of Colorado, Colorado Springs, philip.brown@uccs.edu. Corresponding author.
react to the actions of attackers in an intelligent, strategicallyaware way to mitigate the harm of attacks.
A strategic attacker's approach may be twofold: first, the attacker may directly attack the system and reduce quality-ofservice [10] . Alternatively, the attacker may indirectly reduce quality-of-service by influencing ordinary system users to engage in inefficient behavior; this can include attack methods such as manipulative "social-engineering" attacks [11] , [12] .
The defending autonomous agents' approach is similarly twofold: first, agents should be designed to directly avoid and mitigate the effects of the attacker's actions; second, the autonomous agents should be designed to influence the behavior of ordinary system users so that they avoid and mitigate the effects of the attacker's actions [13] - [15] . This paper asks whether and under what circumstances heterogeneous teams of human and machine decisionmakers can act in concert to provide security for distributed systems, despite a lack of centralized coordination among the decisionmakers. Specifically, we seek distributed decisionmaking architectures that provide emergent security; that is, the distributed decisionmaking rules and interaction framework guarantee that aggregate emergent behavior in the system responds effectively to adversarial manipulation.
We pose a model of collaborative job scheduling on servers: there is a collection of n servers and a constant inflow of jobs; each job requires scheduling on any of the servers. Each job is given either to one of a collection of "machine schedulers" (which then select a server for the job based on a pre-specified algorithm) or the job is selfscheduled (in which case the job is assigned to a server with minimum current service time).
We consider a situation in which an intelligent attacker, wishing to decrease system throughput, selects a server and directly degrades its performance (e.g., by performing a denial-of-service attack that increases average service time) [16] . Subsequently, the machine schedulers and selfscheduled jobs may react to the increased service time on the attacked server and modify their scheduling choices accordingly. The attacker's hope is to maximize the resulting performance degradation, both directly due to increased service times on the affected server and indirectly by manipulating the human and machine scheduling policies to create a cascade of inefficiencies affecting other servers.
In light of this model, our question is simple: can the decision rules of the machine schedulers be designed in such a way that system security emerges as the result of the interactive decisionmaking of the various schedulers? We say that a system exhibits strong emergent security if, for all attacks, the schedulers collectively respond optimally to the attack. On the other hand, we say that a system exhibits weak emergent security if, for all attacks, the performance of the schedulers' collective response is at least no worse than a fixed scheduling policy. Our results are threefold:
Symmetric scheduling: When every server is available to every scheduler and the machine schedulers apply a simple locally-optimal scheduling policy, every system exhibits strong emergent security provided that the fraction of jobs controlled by machine schedulers exceeds some threshold (where this threshold is strictly less than 1). Crucially, this threshold is independent of the number of machine schedulers.
Symmetric scheduling and linear server delay: Here, if the n servers each have identical linear delay functions, provided that at least 1/n of the jobs are controlled by machine schedulers, the collective response to any attack is optimal (i.e., the system has strong emergent security even if only a small minority of jobs are machine-controlled). Furthermore, every system with linear server delay functions exhibits weak emergent security. That is, regardless of the mass of jobs controlled by machine schedulers, we have that for any attack, collective scheduling behavior is always at least as good as a fixed scheduling policy that is unresponsive to attacks.
Constrained server availability:
The above results need not hold in the case that each scheduler can only access a subset of servers. In this case, even if the majority of jobs are centrally controlled by a single machine scheduler, the system may perform nearly as poorly as a completely unresponsive policy. Here, though the system still exhibits weak emergent security, the ability of the machine schedulers to reduce system cost is severely curtailed.
Our results suggest that emergent security of heterogeneous human-machine teams is a valid goal and can be attained with simple and intuitive decision rules. However, designers must take care to understand how constraints and heterogeneity can subvert an otherwise performant system.
II. MODEL
We are given a set of n servers and a total load of n units of jobs requiring service. Following [17] , each individual job is taken to be infinitesimally "small," so that each job contributes a negligible amount to congestion. We denote the load (or mass of scheduled jobs) at server i by x i ≥ 0, and τ i (x i ) denotes the delay suffered by a job at server i under load x i . We assume that each τ i (x i ) is convex, nondecreasing, and continuously differentiable, and that the uncongested service time at all servers is equal, or for all i, j, τ i (0) = τ j (0). A service profile is denoted x := (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ); we require that all jobs are serviced so that i x i = n, which we denote by x ∈ n∆(n) 1 . Our key cost metric is average service delay, denoted 1 Note that for a > 0, we write a∆(n) to denote the standard probability simplex with each of its constraints multiplied by a, so that its vertices are of the form (0, . . . , a . . . , 0).
A. Adversarial action
An adversary, wishing to disrupt the system and increase system cost, selects a server (throughout this paper, we adopt the convention that this server is numbered 1) and attacks it with strength α > 0. The effect of this attack is to uniformly increase service times at server 1 by an amount α; this is modeled by replacing the nominal delay function τ 1 (x 1 ) with the degraded delay function τ
Since the attacker's action directly increases service times for any job on server 1, it induces a new system cost of
B. Heterogeneous Human-Machine Teamed Scheduling
The main goal of this paper is to understand the effects of human-machine teaming on the security of distributed systems. To accomplish this, we consider a case in which there are m engineered schedulers (called machine schedulers) acting in conjunction with a population of uncoordinated human schedulers. The system designer endows the machine schedulers with decision rules with which they select a scheduling profile, whereas the human schedulers select a server on the basis of minimizing their own service delay.
Machine scheduler k ∈ {1, . . . , m} is responsible for scheduling a mass of r k jobs, with r := m k=1 r k ≤ n. We refer to r as the machine penetration level of the system. We term the remaining n−r jobs selfish jobs, and we model their "behavior" by assuming that each infinitesimal job among the selfish jobs has a human owner that schedules it with the singular goal of minimizing its service time, given the attacker's action and the choices of other jobs. Figure 1 contains a simple depiction of the model. We allow each machine scheduler to schedule on any of the n servers, so each machine scheduler k selects a service profile
Given a collection of machinescheduled profiles {x k } and a selfishly-scheduled profile x s , the aggregate load on machine i is given by
The aggregate scheduling profile resulting from teamed scheduling is represented x = (x s , x 1 , . . . x m ). Sometimes, to highlight the dependence of a scheduling profile on the actions of a particular machine k, we may also represent an aggregate profile as x = (x s , x k , x −k ), where x −k denotes the scheduling by machine schedulers other than k.
We model the aggregate behavior resulting from the collective decisionmaking of the m machine schedulers and the selfish jobs by a concept that we term team equilibriumx, or an aggregate scheduling profile satisfyinḡ
Depiction of teamed scheduling setup for the nominal model descried in Section II-B and considered in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. Any of the k machine schedulers and any of the self-schedulers are free to schedule a job on any of the n servers.
Note that at a team equilibrium, (3) implies that each machine scheduler is scheduling (globally) optimally (given the choices of others), and (4) implies that each selfish job is selecting a server with minimum delay (given the choices of others). Known results for heterogeneous congestion games give us the following proposition:
Proposition 2.1: For any α ≥ 0, any n ≥ 2, any m ≥ 1, and any {r k } m k=1 satisfying m k=1 r k ≤ n, the above game has a team equilibriumx.
This follows immediately from elementary equilibrium existence results in nonatomic games [18] - [20] .
C. Emergent Security
We say that a system exhibits emergent security if the teamed agents in the system (both human and engineered) naturally adapt to attacks in such a way that the system performance remains near-optimal even when the system is under attack.
In this context, we distinguish between different degrees of security by comparing the performance of a team equilibrium against that of two benchmarks:
Optimal scheduling: Given α, we denote a globally optimal scheduling policy by x * (α) ∈ arg min x C α (x). The ultimate goal in the emergent security paradigm is for the performance of team equilibria to equal that of x * (α). Unresponsive scheduling: Here, we compare the performance of a team equilibrium to that of an unresponsive baseline scheduling policy that we denote x b (α); this policy is optimal at no-attacks when α = 0, but is unresponsive to changes in α. That is, for all α ≥ 0, x b (α) = x * (0). Since this scheduling policy is constant in α, we typically denote it simply x b . Using these two definitions, we can now state the main qualitative performance metric of the paper: Definition 2.1: We say that a system exhibits strong emergent security if, for all α ≥ 0, it holds that all team equilibria are optimal. That is, ifx(α) is a team equilibrium, we have that for all α ≥ 0,
On the other hand, we say that a system exhibits weak emergent security if, for all α ≥ 0, it holds that all team equilibria are no worse than unresponsive scheduling. That is, ifx(α) is a team equilibrium, we have that
III. CONTRIBUTIONS
A. Team scheduling exhibits emergent security for symmetric schedulers
Our first theorem is a general result on the effectiveness of heterogeneous human-machine teams: we show that performance guarantees for such systems are monotone nondecreasing in the machine penetration level. Furthermore, for high-enough machine penetration, every system exhibits strong emergent security.
Theorem
Furthermore, for every collection of delay functions {τ i }, there exists a machine penetration thresholdr < n such that if r ≥r, then the system exhibits strong emergent security.
That is, for all α ≥ 0 the resulting team equilibrium (denoted x(r, α)) is a globally optimal response:
The proof hinges on the fact that the problem of finding a team equilibrium is equivalent to finding a Nash flow for a heterogeneous price-sensitive user population in a parallelnetwork routing game under the influence of marginal-cost tolls. Accordingly, the proof follows naturally from results in [21] pertaining to this problem; the proof's full details are omitted for brevity. Theorem 3.1 provides three things: first, when all schedulers have access to all servers, an implication of (7) is that heterogeneous human-machine teams are at least as performant as self-scheduled jobs. Second, for a fixed α, increasing the penetration level of machine schedulers can never harm the performance of the system. Third, regardless of the number of machine schedulers, team scheduling is globally optimal provided that the fraction of self-scheduled jobs is small enough. Crucially here, every system may have a positive mass of self-scheduled jobs and still exhibit optimal team scheduling for all attack levels α.
It is important to note that the results of Theorem 3.1 do not rely in any way on explicit coordination or communication between the various machine schedulers. The only coordination between machine schedulers happens implicitly through the machines' common objective function.
B. Closed-form expressions for linear delay functions
Theorem 3.1 paints a broad picture of the benefits of machine scheduling (even if uncoordinated), but gives little hint as to the actual performance gains possible. In particular, the only information given about the optimal machine penetration thresholdr is thatr < n; but the question remains: how much less than n? Accordingly, our next theorem reports the effects of team scheduling in closed-form for a simplified setting. Here, we consider the case that all servers have identical linear delay functions, or τ i (x i ) = x i . In this setting, it is simple to observe that the nominal optimal scheduling policy under no attack has x i = 1 for all i. The following theorem characterizes the effects of n, r and α on the efficiency of team equilibria. Theorem 3.2: For this system, given α, it holds that
When r ≥r, the system exhibits strong emergent security and we have that every team equilibriumx is globally optimal, satisfying
When r ∈ r − α(n−1)
2n ,r , we have that every associated team equilibriumx strictly outperforms the fully-selfish equilibrium and satisfies
Finally, when r ≤ 1 − α(n−1) n , we have that every associated team equilibriumx is equal to a fully selfish equilibrium and satisfies
That is, for all r ∈ [0, n], this system exhibits weak emergent security.
The proof of Theorem 3.2 appears in the Appendix. Several things are of note here. First, the penetration thresholdr is quite low: at most, only a 1/n fraction of jobs need to be under the control of machine schedulers to ensure that all team equilibria are optimal. Second, no matter how many jobs are sent to machine schedulers, every team equilibrium is guaranteed to have a relative cost less than n/(n − 1) ≤ 2, regardless of the strength of the attack. Compared to a baseline policy which is unresponsive to attacks, this represents a dramatic potential reduction in cost, since the unresponsive policy has a cost of 1 + α/n, unbounded in α. Finally, equation (11) implies that if the machine scheduler penetration is too low, the selfish schedulers entirely dominate the scheduling profile and the machine schedulers have no effect. In fact, for moderate attacks when α ≤ n/(n−1), (12) indicates that this situation is identical in cost to the unresponsive baseline scheduling policy x b which simply ignores attacks. Figure 2 depicts the dependence of the normalized system cost on the machine penetration level r for various attack levels α. 
C. Loss of security due to scheduling constraints
The result of Theorem 3.1 is appealing in its simplicity: if all schedulers (both machine and selfish) have access to scheduling on all servers, then an optimal policy for each machine is often simply to behave as though it were the only scheduler and schedule its own jobs globally optimally given the choices of others. In this section, we ask if the result would change if some servers were inaccessible to some of the schedulers; we show that even very simple scheduling constraints can render Theorem 3.1's optimal scheduling policies almost entirely ineffective.
Consider the setting of Theorem 3.2, in which there are n ≥ 3 identical servers with delay functions τ i (x i ) = x i , but now suppose that the self-scheduled traffic can only access servers 1 and 2, and that each of the machine schedulers can access any server numbered 2 through n (that is, machine schedulers can access any server other than 1). As before, let r denote the mass of jobs controlled by the machine schedulers; to ensure that this system's optimal operating point is identical to the system of Theorem 3.2 for each α ≥ 0, we enforce an additional constraint that r = n − 1. See Figure 3 for a depiction of this constrained system.
In this constrained context, our first question is this: if the machine schedulers apply the naive optimal scheduling policy informed by Theorem 3.1, how does this system's security compare to the unconstrained system of Theorem 3.2? Theorem 3.3 demonstrates that despite the fact that the machine schedulers control the vast majority of jobs, the new constraint completely nullifies the previous benefits of machine scheduling. Theorem 3.3: For n ≥ 3, in the above system, let an attacker attack server 1 with attack strength α ≥ 0. Letx(α) be a team equilibrium, and let x n (α) be an uncoordinated self-scheduled equilibrium obtained by converting all jobs to selfish jobs. Then we have
The proof is straightforward and is omitted for brevity.
In the above system, even if the machine schedulers Fig. 3 . Depiction of constrained scheduling setup for Section III-C and Theorems 3.3 and 3.4. The 1 unit of self-scheduled jobs can only access servers 1 and 2, while the n − 1 units of machine-scheduled jobs can access any server numbered 2 through n.
control a majority fraction of (n − 1)/n of the total traffic, simply being unable to access a single machine can dramatically increase the attacker's ability to harm overall system performance. In fact, for attacks with α ≤ n/(n − 1), it holds that no team equilibrium outperforms an unresponsive scheduling policy, or
, just as in (12) . To compare (13) with system optimal, consider Figure 4 ; there, the solid (blue) trace corresponds to the constrained team scheduling in (13) , and the dashed (green) trace corresponds to system optimal scheduling.
Note that Theorem 3.3 holds for the case that the machine schedulers behave in an uncoordinated manner, each attempting to optimize global performance given the choices of others. What if, on the other hand, a machine scheduler had a "bigger-picture" view of the situation, and could schedule its traffic in anticipation of the self-schedulers' response?
To understand the effect of such socially-aware machine scheduling, we model this as a Stackelberg equilibrium in which a single machine scheduler selects a policy for servers {2, . . . , n} and then the selfish schedulers select between servers 1 and 2 on the basis of delay, reminiscent of [22] .
Here, we denote the machine-scheduled policy by x m = (x 
Given the machine's choice of x m , the selfish schedulers choose between servers 1 and 2 to satisfy the Nash condition (4) given in this case by
Given α ≥ 0, we say that a scheduling profile (x m (α),x s (α)) is a Stackelberg equilibrium if it satisfieŝ
where x s (x m ) denotes that the selfish jobs have scheduled according to (15) , given the choice of x m . Fig. 4 . Normalized costs C α (x) for uninfluenced team equilibrium (Equation (13), optimal Stackelberg equilibrium (Equation (18)), and globallyoptimal scheduling profile (Equation (9)) plotted with respect to α for n = 3. Note that for moderate values of α, the Stackelberg equilibrium slightly improves upon the uninfluenced equilibrium, but only by a very small amount compared to the gains possible with global scheduling.
The following theorem reports the optimal Stackelberg strategy, and demonstrates that only slight security gains are possible in this situation.
Theorem 3.4: For n ≥ 3, in the above system, let an attacker attack server 1 with attack strength α ≥ 0. The following scheduling policy enforces an optimal Stackelberg equilibrium satisfying (16):
otherwise. (17) and for all i > 2, x m i = (n − 1 − x m 2 )/(n − 2). Letx(α) be an optimal Stackelberg equilibrium enforced by policy (17) . Then we have
An abbreviated proof of Theorem 3.4 appears in the Appendix.
Clearly, the normalized cost in the Stackelberg case (18) is always less than the nominal uninfluenced cost from Theorem 3.3, but Figure 4 clearly illustrates that this improvement is quite small when compared to the optimal attainable value from (9) . That is, Theorem 3.4 suggests that the inefficiency introduced by scheduling constraints presents a fundamental impediment to system performance, and is thus deserving of further study.
IV. CONCLUSION
The results in this paper represent an initial summary look at several possible issues that can arise when distributed autonomous decisionmaking architectures are integrated with those of self-interested human agents. While certain systems are highly receptive to mixed human-autonomous decisionmaking (such as the unconstrained system of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2), in other types of system, machine scheduling is essentially useless (in the sense that selfish scheduling would perform just as well, as in Theorem 3.3). In such systems, even socially-aware machine schedulers (which make decisions in light of their impacts on other decisionmakers) need not improve the situation much. Put together, this paper paints an optimistic picture of the possible benefits of humanmachine teams in certain circumstances -but it also tells a cautionary tale of some potential challenges and pitfalls of the teamed paradigm.
APPENDIX

Proof of Theorem 3.2
First observe that for any machine penetration level r and attack level α, every associated team equilibriumx(α) has x i =x j for all i, j > 1. If some server had lower utilization, then either a machine scheduler or a human-scheduled job would prefer to switch to that server.
For any α ≥ 0, it is straightforward to verify that the globally optimal scheduling policy x * has x * 1 = max{0, 1 − α(n−1)
2n }, and the remaining jobs divided evenly among servers 2 through n, so that for i > 1, x * i = min{n/(n − 1), 1+ 2n . Given this r, let x be an aggregate profile with x 1 < x * 1 and the remaining jobs divided equally among servers 2 through n. In x, some machine must be scheduling a positive mass of jobs on a server other than 1; this machine could improve the value of its objective by shifting some jobs to server 1 to bring x 1 closer to x * 1 , implying that x is not a team equilibrium. On the other hand, let x be an aggregate profile with x 1 > x * 1 and the remaining jobs divided equally among servers 2 through n. In x , it is straightforward to verify that τ 1 (x 1 )+α > τ 2 (x 2 ), implying that if selfish jobs are selecting 1, x cannot be a team equilibrium. Further, if all of the jobs on server 1 are machine-scheduled, some of them could be shifted to servers 2 through n to bring the total cost of the profile closer to optimal. Thus, x is not a team equilibrium, and it must be the case that when r ≥ 1 − α(n−1) 2n , every team equilibrium is globally-optimal; (9) may be verified by substituting the aforementioned values of x * 1 and x * i into (2). The proofs of (10) and (11) Here, if x 1 > 0, then x 1 + α = x 2 and if x 1 + α > x 2 , then x 1 = 0. Given this, it is not difficult to verify that the solutions to (19) satisfy (17) .
